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RECENT ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS
Question:
"Under our laws shall property be assessed at the value of
the time it is assessed or on the preceding (sic) 5 years average
of its value?"
The subject appears to be governed by the provisions of Section
57-02-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, as amended, which
provides in part:
"DEFINITIONS.-As used in this title, unless the context or
subject matter otherwise requires:
1. through 3.****
4. 'True and full value' means the usual selling price at
the place where the property to which the term is applied
shall be at the time of the assessment, that being the
price at which it could be obtained at private sale, and
not at a forced public auction sale. In arriving at the
true and full value, consideration may be given to the
earning or productive capacity, if any, the market value,
if any, and all other matters that affect the actual value
of the property to be assessed.
5. through 10.***" (emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, it would appear that the assessment shall be at the
value as of the time of assessment rather than by any other
formula respecting time.
Unaware of any statute relating to the establishment of value by
assessment which relates to a formula founded in averaging over
a period of years, we can only conclude that property shall be
assessed at the value of the time it is assessed rather than by
averaging the preceding five year valuations of such property.
Question:
With regard to the application of section 43-23-05 of the 1969
Supplement to the North Dakota Century Code.
It is called to our attention, that portion of the above cited statute
providing that:
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"REAL ESTATE LICENSE REQUIRED.-***No copartner-
ship, association, or corporation shall be granted a license,
unless every member or officer of such copartnership, associ-
ation, or corporation actually engaged as a real estate broker,
real estate salesman, or mortgage broker as defined herein,
shall hold a license as a real estate broker, and unless every
employee who acts as a real estate salesman or mortgage
broker for such copartnership, association, or corporation shall
hold a license as a real estate salesman or mortgage broker."
A situation exists whereby a licensed real estate salesman employed
by a real estate corporation has requested to become licensed
as a broker for the firm. It is indicated that the firm is presently
managed by a licensed real estate broker who is a corporate
officer in the firm. The salesman has indicated that he has no
intentions of becoming an officer in the corporation. Technically,
it appears that under these circumstances he will still be performing
the functions of a salesman even though he has requested licensing
as a broker. It is noted that a real estate salesman and broker
are two distinctly different occupations.
The question is whether a licensed real estate broker can be em-
ployed by a licensed real estate corporation and act in the capacity
as a broker without becoming an officer or stockholder in the
corporation.
We would assume that in the usual instance the purpose of such
a statutory provision is to assure professional ability, capacity and
ethics in those operating or strongly influencing the operations
of a professional firm and to prevent actual unlicensed practice
of the profession, by individuals, employed by or in control of
professional firms. There is nothing in the terminology or purpose
of this statutory provision indicating in any manner that same
was intended to apply to the converse of the situation described
in the statute.
We do note that the statutory chapter does have separate definitions
for "real estate broker" and "real estate salesman." From the
facts you state it does seem possible to conclude that the functions
that will be performed by this individual on behalf of the employer
will be those described under subsection 2 of section 43-23-06 of
the North Dakota Century Code. There is, however, nothing in
Chapter 43-23 of the North Dakota Century Code prohibiting one
individual from acting both as a real estate broker and as a
real estate salesman. Also, we find nothing in the statute actually
indicating that one real estate broker cannot work for or be employed
by another real estate broker.
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On such basis, it is our conclusion that a licensed real estate
broker can be employed by a licensed real estate broker-corpora-
tion and act in the capacity of a broker without becoming an
officer or stockholder in the corporation.
Question:
With regard to the legality of marriages between first cousins
within the State of North Dakota where the parties to the marriage
are related through adoption wherein one or the other of the first
cousins was adopted into the family and no consanguine relation-
ship -exists.
The questions are:
"1. Would such a marriage be considered incestuous pursuant
to the provisions of section 12-22-06 of the North Dakota
Century Code?
2. If the relationship between the parties were known to the
County Judge prior to application for marriage license,
could the County Judge issue a marriage license to such
individuals who are first cousins through adoption?
3. Assuming a marriage of first cousins by way of adoption
did exist and your opinion would indicate that the marriage
was not incestuous nor void or voidable or any combination
of such circumstances would inheritance rights of either
spouse or children of the parties be effective?"
We note at 52 Am Jur 2d, 917-918 Marriage Section 65 the statement
that:
"Section 65. RELATIONSHIP BY MARRIAGE (AFFINITY) OR
ADOPTION. Some state incest statutes extend their prohibition
against marriage not only to persons related by blood, but
also to persons related only by affinity, or in other words, by
marriage. In the past the scope of the prohibited relationships
by affinity was frequently almost coextensive with the prohi-
bitions applicable to blood relatives, but affinity as a basis of
incest prohibitions has been severely criticized, and many stat-
utes today limit the prohibition against marriage of persons
related by affinity to certain close relatives of the spouse, or
else eliminate affinity completely as an obstacle to marriage.
Furthermore, affinity statutes have, in some instances, been
rendered of little value by the holding that the relation of
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affinity between one spouse and the blood relatives of the other
ceases as soon as a divorce has been granted or on the death
of either spouse, at least when there is no living issue of such
marriage.
Under existing affinity statutes, however, marriages have been
held illegal when contracted by a woman and her father-in-law,
a woman and her step-grandson, a man and his stepdaughter,
a man and the widow of his uncle, and a man and his brother's
widow.
As to whether persons related only by adoption, and not by
marriage, may marry each other, the position of the courts
is unclear. While it might seem that such a marriage, if the
relationship by adoption was of a degree within which marriage
is prohibited, would be barred in any event by the fact that
legal adoption is ordinarily held to create all of the legal con-
sequences, obligations, and incidents arising and growing out
of the status of natural parent and child, it has been held
that a couple unrelated by blood, but first cousins by adoption,
are not barred from marrying by incest statutes that forbid
the marriage of first cousins."
We note further at 41 Am Jur 2d, 516-517 Incest Section 7 the
statement that:
"Section 7. RELATIONSHIP BY MARRIAGE. Relationship by
consanguinity, or blood, is necessary to bring a person within
the provisions of some statutes defining and punishing incest.
Statutes extending to relatives by affinity, or marriage, the
prohibition of incest are strictly construed in favor of the de-
fendant. Under such statutes incest may be committed by a
brother-in-law with a sister-in-law, and by a brother with a
deceased brother's widow.
A man is related by affinity to all the blood relatives of
his wife and vice versa. There is, however, no affinity between
the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of
the other.
Stepparents are related by affinity to their stepchildren, and
sexual intercourse between them is incestuous under statutes
including relationship by affinity, but not where the statutes
are restricted to consanguinity.***"
We note also at 41 Am Jur 2d, 516 Incest Section 6 the following:
"***Sexual intercourse with an adopted child is not incestuous
where the statute requires blood relationship for the crime
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of incest. An adopted child has been held not to be a "daughter"
within an incest statute forbidding sexual relations between
persons within the degrees within which marriages are de-
clared to be incestuous and void, the marriage law providing
that a father shall not marry his "daughter."
Section 14-11-13 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
"STATUS OF ADOPTED CHILD.-The child so adopted shall
be deemed, as respects all legal consequences and incidents
of the natural relation of parent and child, the child of such
parent or parents by adoption the same as if he had been born
to them in lawful wedlock."
Section 14-03-03 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in part:
"VOID MARRIAGES.-The following marriages are incestuous
and void:
5. Marriage between first cousins of the half as well as the
whole blood. This section shall apply to illegitimate as well
as legitimate children and relatives."
Section 12-22-06 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
"'INCEST' DEFINED-PUNISHMENT.-Any person who inter-
marries, cohabits, or has sexual intercourse with another person
related to him within a degree of consanguinity within which
marriages by the laws of this state are declared incestuous
and void, knowing such other person to be within said degree
of relationship, is guilty of incest and shall be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one year
nor more than ten years."
Looking to these statutes it would appear to us in the first instance
that the criminal statute refers only to relatives by consanguinity
and that the marriage statute refers to relatives by "the half
or the whole blood," which to some extent at least would indicate
that the legislative assembly did not by these enactments intend
to include other relationships such as those established by marriage
or legal decree. We note such cases as State of Mississippi vs.
Lee; 17 So.2d 277 and the case cited in the annotation thereto
People v. Kaiser 119 Cal 456, 51 P 702 (1897) where the courts
decided very definitely that the word "daughter" in such situations
did not mean, "adopted daughter," "step-daughter" or "daughter-
in-law."
On the basis of these authorities it would thus be our opinion
that a marriage between "cousins only related by way of an adop-
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tion" is not prohibited by either sections 14-03-03 or 12-22-06 of
the North Dakota Century Code. We find nothing in these statutes
that would prevent a county judge from issuing a marriage license
to persons who are cousins only related by way of adoption. While
some confusion might arise in determining degrees of relationship
for purposes for example of applying the laws of intestate succes-
sion in matters involving persons who are by reason of an adoption
legally cousins, and who by reason of a marriage are also man
and wife, we would assume that both the adoption proceeding and
the marriage proceeding should properly be considered legal, valid
and binding for the purpose of determining inheritance rights.
Question:
Requesting clarification of the power and authority of the State
of North Dakota on Indian reservations in terms of protective
services and licensing of foster homes.
The State of North Dakota provides protective services for
abused and neglected children under chapter 50-25 of the North
Dakota Century Code and further corrective measures under the
authority of the Juvenile Court Act under chapter 27-20. The licens-
ing and supervision of foster homes is discharged under chapter
50-11. It is recognized that there may be other statutes, interpreta-
tions and decisions which may also have a bearing on this question.
The first question is:
"Does the authority of the State of North Dakota as defined
in terms of protective services and enforcement of licensing func-
tions apply to situations involving Indian children who live on Indian
reservations within the state?"
Licensing of foster homes includes inspection of the home, evalu-
ating the home in terms of established standards, and participating
in enforcement of compliance with standards.
The second question is:
"Specifically, can the Public Welfare Board legally enforce this
licensing function on the Indian Reservation?"
We are enclosing herewith xerox copy of letter of this office
of date January 16, 1967, to the State Plumbing Inspector, with
regard to State Plumbing Board activities on Indian Reservations,
xerox copy of letter of this office of date November 27, 1968,
to the special assistant attorney general for the State Electrical
Board, with regard to State Electrical Board activities on Indian
Reservations and xerox copy of letter of this office of date February
5, 1969, to the assistant attorney general for the State Electrical
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Board, with regard to State Electrical Board activities on Indian
Reservations.
While, we do, of course, recognize many distinctions between
the activities of your department in supervision of foster homes,
and the functions of the State electrical and plumbing boards,
we should mention that the basic authority relied upon, in regard
to electrical and plumbing board functions, was In Re. Whiteshield
124 N.W. 2d 694 (1963) in which the Supreme Court of this State
determined that the juvenile division of the State district court
did not have jurisdiction to terminate parental rights of an Indian
family on the Indian reservation.
It would thus be our opinion that your department does not
have authority to enforce licensing functions with regard to foster
homes caring for Indian children who live on Indian reservations
within the State. We would thus further assume that the offense
defined in section 50-11-10 of the 1969 Supplement to the North
Dakota Century Code, would in effect, in regard to these situations,
be an offense by a non-Indian, or Indian, involving other Indians;
i.e., the children cared for by these foster homes; and thus the
State courts would not have jurisdiction of such offenses. As stated
by our Supreme Court in In Re. Whiteshield 124 N.W. 2d 694 at
page 695 of the N.W. 2d reporter:
"In recent cases decided prior to the 1958 amendment of
Section 203 of the North Dakota Constitution, Chapter 430
of the Session Laws of 1959, and the effective date of Chapter
242 of the Session Laws of 1963, dealing with jurisdiction over
civil causes arising on Indian country, it was held that North
Dakota courts had no jurisdiction over a person alleged to
have committed a crime under the State's laws against one
who is an Indian allegedly committed on an Indian reserva-
tion. State v. Kuntz, 66 N.W. 2d 531, (N.D. 1954), and State
vs. Lohnes, 69 N.W. 2d 508, (N.D. 1955).***"
We are familiar with the Federal law embodied in 25 U.S.C.A.
231, which provides:
"ENFORCEMENT OF STATE LAWS AFFECTING HEALTH
AND EDUCATION; ENTRY OF STATE EMPLOYEES
ON INDIAN LANDS.-The Secretary of the Interior, under
such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, shall permit
the agents and employees of any State to enter upon Indian
tribal lands, reservations, or allotments therein (1) for the
purpose of making inspection of health and educational con-
ditions and enforcing sanitation and quarantine regulations
or (2) to enforce the penalties of State compulsory school
attendance laws against Indian children, and parents, or
other persons in loco parentis except that this subparagraph
559
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(2) shall not apply to Indians of any tribe in which a duly
constituted governing body exists until such body has adopted
a resolution consenting to such appilcation."
While this statutory provision may well embody a Federal con-
sent to the State's accepting jurisdiction, for these purposes on
Indian reservations the State of North Dakota has not consented
to acceptance of such jurisdiction except in accordance with the
terms of chapter 27-19 of the 1969 Supplement to the North Dakota
Century Code; and, of course, this Federal statute does not consti-
tute compliance with the terms of this State statute.
We are also familiar with the Federal law embodied in 25
U.S.C.A. 452 which provides:
"CONTRACTS FOR EDUCATION, MEDICAL ATTENTION,
RELIEF AND SOCIAL WELFARE OF INDIANS.-The Sec-
retary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to
enter a contract or contracts with any State or Territory,
or political subdivision thereof, or with any State university,
college or school, or with any appropriate State or private
corporation, agency, or institution, for the education, medical
attention, agricultural assistance, and social welfare, includ-
ing relief of distress, of Indians in such State or Territory,
through the agencies of the State or Territory or of the cor-
porations and organizations herein before named, and to ex-
pend under such contract or contracts, moneys appropriated
by Congress for the education, medical attention, agricul-
tural assistance, and social welfare, including relief of dis-
tress, of Indians in such State or Territory."
While such statutory provisions could possibly be of assistance
to State agencies wishing to participate in Federal functions in
these fields on Indian reservations, it seems doubtful that it could
be extended to the point of allowing actual enforcement of the
State Foster home licensing statutes, in the usual sense, where
the State has not acquired full jurisdiction in the area involved.
It is thus our opinion that the Public Welfare Board cannot
legally enforce the licensing function prescribed in chapter 50-11
of the North Dakota Century Code, as amended to date, insofar
as it concerns foster care homes either operated by Indians or
caring for Indians on the Indian Reservations.
